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Abstract 
 
 
The UK is at the leading edge of development in modern regulatory corporate 
governance as a complement to company law. It is observed that the UK follows a 
shareholder primacy, or Anglo-American corporate governance model prioritising 
shareholder interests over other stakeholders. Several qualitative studies asserted the 
h< ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚ of shareholder primacy corporate governance, however, 
this is the first article which specifically examines the key twenty year period from 
1995 -2014 to track changes in UK corporate governance norms against the OECD 
recommended principles of corporate governance in the context of financial market 
growth. Specifically, we present a qualitative analysis of the major normative change 
points in UK corporate governance before assessing the impact of these structural 
changes in UK corporate governance on financial market growth. This will be achieved 
by quasi-empirical analysis comparing normative change points empirically, followed 
by a more traditional structural model. We find that compared to the OECD model of 
corporate governance, UK corporate governance is less rigid and follows a more self-
regulatory approach, based uƉŽŶĂ  ‘ĐŽŵƉůǇŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?ŵŽĚĞů ĂŶĚ as such, scoring 
below countries following compulsory implementation models. Uniquely however, 
ĞǀĞŶǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚ ‘ůŽǁ ?ƚŝůƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐformal shareholder primacy norms - the UK has the 
best performing financial market. As a quasi-empirical study we posit that several 
historical and economic reasons with a robust rule of law in the UK - contribute to 
such a performance  W and the law especially the type or tilt is less relevant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Empirical corporate governance, shareholder primacy, comparative law, 
law and financial development, corporate governance evolution, financial market 
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Introduction 
 
Simplistically, corporate governance concerns the separation of functions between a 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐďŽĂƌĚŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂŶŶƵĂůŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ?'D ?ŽĨƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ
or stakeholders. It concerns itself with the balance of power as between the directors 
at a managerial level, and the shareholders or stakeholders, whose involvement in the 
company may represent direct or indirect investment through electoral functions. At 
the most basic level, any division between ownership/investment, and control 
prompts the risk observed by Smith (1838)1 P ‘ƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƐƵĐŚĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ũŽŝŶƚ
ƐƚŽĐŬĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƌĂƚŚĞƌŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŵŽŶĞǇƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
of their own, it cannot be expected that they should watch over it with the same 
ĂŶǆŝŽƵƐǀŝŐŝůĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƐŝĨŝƚǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ? ? ? The focus of this discussion is to consider 
how corporate governance has evolved normatively in the UK, benchmarked against 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004, and to provide a quasi-
experimental analysis to discuss its impact upon financial market growth. 
 
It is perhaps surprising, in hindsight, that the interest in corporate governance largely 
represents a reactive response, prompted by the catalogue of high impact corporate 
ĞǀĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵŝĚ ? ? ? ? ?ƐŽŶǁĂƌĚƐ- highlighted in the UK by the 1995 collapse of 
Barings Bank, but followed globally by Enron, Royal Ahold, Parmalat, HIH, China 
Aviation Oil, etc. This is not to suggest that the UK had no means of assuring 
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŝŵĞ ? ďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
previously ƌĞůŝĞĚƵƉŽŶĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŵŽĚĞů ? 
proved to be dramatically inadequate and gave rise to significant questions. In other 
words, the basic convictions that UK corporate governance had rested upon for so 
long, that annual reports and audited accounts would provide sufficient confidence 
and protection for shareholders/stakeholders proved to be too simplistic and perhaps 
naïve in some instances.  
 
UK corporate governance evolution and development is characterised by the 
dominĂŶƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ǀĂůƵĞ ? ǁŝĚĞůǇ ƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚ ŝŶ ŶŐůŽ-American 
corporate governance, and thereby largely reflective of an agency theory perspective. 
Simplistically, as reflected by the pioneering research conducted by Berle and Means 
(1932) 2 , pertaining to the separation of ownership and ontrol, the corporate 
managers are placed in the role of an agent, with the shareholder as principal. The 
primary managerial focus of directors ŝƐƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶ ‘ĨŝĚƵĐŝĂƌǇĚƵƚǇ ? ?ƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ
of the company by reflecting the interests of current and future shareholders. 
Corporate governance in the UK has, therefore, traditionally concerned itself with a 
rather narrow perspective focusing on the relationship between board members, 
management, and shareholders, in contrast with some jurisdictions, particularly 
Germany and Japan, where the function of corporate governance has traditionally 
addressed the interests of a wider range of stakeholders. 
 
                                                        
1 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (first published 1776, W. Strathan and T. Cadell 1838) 574 
2 A Berle and G Means, The modern Corporation and Private Property (The Macmillan Company, 
1932) 
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Whilst the foundations of UK corporate governance in the 21st century can be viewed 
as emerging from the acceptance of the corporate model as a vehicle for wider 
commercial growth in the 19th century, the focus and scrutiny of the last 25 years 
activated a structural and normative evolution in governance which continues to rely 
largely on a regime of self-regulation balanced with statutory guidance. The impetus 
for such scrutiny emanated from general global commercial growth (typified in the UK 
by non-familial shareholder investment), the influence of EU harmonisation, OECD 
recommendations, and perhaps (more significantly) the series of domestic and global 
economic corporate shocks beginning with Barings and Enron. This article explores the 
normative evolution of UK corporate governance, considering its impact on the basic 
assumptions of the h< ?Ɛ  ‘ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ǀĂůƵĞ ? ƐƚĂŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶŐůŽ-American 
position in order to assess its role in the context of ĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞ
UK financial market and financial market development and growth more generally. 
Firstly we quantify the 2004 OECD Principles into fifty-two individual variables. 
Secondly we analyse how these factors have evolved in the UK between 1995 and 
2014. Thirdly, we create an index to chart the development of UK corporate 
governance in relation to the OECD principles. Fourthly we complement our empirical 
study by referencing: the position which preceded the period of corporate shock; an 
overview of the initial Combined Code (1998) growing from the Cadbury, Greenbury 
and Hampel reports; The Combined Codes (2003, 2006 and 2008); The impact of the 
Companies Act 2006; the OECD and EU influence; as well as the 2014-2015 Review of 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which resulted in the G20 Principles of 
Corporate Governance demonstrating a greater possible future attunement towards 
a more enlightened shareholder value (ESV). Finally we merge and graphically 
visualize the previously discussed UK normative corporate governance development 
change points with UK financial market development change points before concluding 
the article.  
 
Review of Literature  
 
Researching effective corporate governance mechanisms 3  and associated 
developments such as attributable performance parameters in global and domestic 
financial markets is increasingly at the centre of academic discourse. Controversially, 
much of the early scholarly debates on corporate governance functionality adopted 
monistic perspectives. That means, despite corporate governance developments 
paralleling dynamic, highly complex, systemic changes such as the proliferation of 
financial market integration and the emergence of legal transnationalism, scholars 
predominantly adopted and presented singular, generalist viewpoints. Hence, as a 
ƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐďĞŝŶŐĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ‘ǇŽƵŶŐ ?ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ
research discipline, existing work can often be characterised as being intra- instead of 
                                                        
3 Ǯǯ
basic categories set out by Jensen (1993) 1. Legal and regulatory mechanisms, 2. Internal control 
mechanisms, 3. External control mechanisms, 4. Product market competition; in Michael C. ǡǮǡǡ	ǯ
[2003] The Journal of Finance 831 
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interdisciplinary, therefore only offering partial, incomplete and static4 insight, which 
we identify to be a serious contentual deficit in present literature.  
 
Since the early days of corporate governance research the composition of global and 
domestic financial markets and corresponding regulatory framework configurations 
have been subject to transformative changes that ultimately seek to balance and 
reconcile corporate performance with effective regulatory oversight mechanisms. In 
this context it is noteworthy that incessant changes ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ĨŝƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ
ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?ĂƐDenis (2001)5 ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ ‘ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
ďĂƐĞƐ ŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽƵƌ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ŝĚĞĂƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ĂƌĞ ďƵŝůƚ ? ?6  This 
underlines the importance of empirical, structured research centred on the trajectory 
of corporate governance evolution in a UK legal context. Despite these key 
generational developments being reflected in the quantity and variety of corporate 
governance research literature, produced over the last two decades, we observe 
further significant methodological shortcomings. Indicative of this is the widespread 
use of cross-sectional databases 7  instead of longitudinal databases and/or a 
combination thereof when analysing historical and current corporate governance 
development parameters and contextualising these within financial markets and 
financial market growth. Therefore we establish that the academic analysis produced 
thus far, lacks a systematic, coherent, critical in-depth approach, based on longitudinal 
empirical data that refines the conception of corporate governance evolution in a UK 
legal context. Consequently, for the past two decades it has generally offered more 
questions than answers to academics and practitioners alike. 
 
An analysis presenting and addressing some of the most pressing research questions, 
albeit based on more narrow economic perspectives, has been offered by Kole and 
Lehn  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ůŝƚƚůĞ ŝƐ ŬŶŽǁŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ
structures ?8. The authors identify the lack of systematic analysis, including corporate 
governance structure stability patterns and their parameters.9 Significantly, they pose 
questions surrounding their potential to adapt10 to dynamically changing corporate 
environments including the respective costs of these potential changes. While Kole 
and Lehn introduce the concept of corporate governance evolution and present an 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ůŝŶĞ ŽĨ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĨŝƌŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĨĂŝů ƚŽ ĂĚĂƉƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ
governance structure ƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ? ? ?ĨĂĐĞĞǆƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůƐĞĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĨŽƌŵƐ ?11, which has also been referred to as the  ‘ĂƌǁŝŶŝĂŶ
ǀŝĞǁ ?ŽŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇƚŚĞǇĂůƐŽacknowledge the 
                                                        
4 Stacey ǡǡǮDeregulation, the Evolution of Corporate Governance Structure, and 
Survivalǯ [1997] The American Economic Review 421 
5 ǤǡǮTwenty-ǥǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ
Review of Financial Economics 191 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid  
8 Stacey ǡǡǮDeregulation, the Evolution of Corporate Governance Structure, and 
Survivalǯ [1997] The American Economic Review 421 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
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 ‘ĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?12 Similarly and more importantly they also note an absence of 
Ă ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĚĞĞƉĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂƌǁŝŶŝĂŶǀŝĞǁ ?
thereby illustrating its very limitations. While it can be recognised that corporations 
are increasingly entering an international competition13 and as such, are competitors 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞďĞƐƚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂƌǁŝŶŝĂŶǀŝĞǁ ?ŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ
evolution appears too simplistic, excluding various additional factors that contribute 
to corporate governance evolution, such as geopolitical and/or socio-political 14 , 
technological and other external circumstances. Most significantly however, Kole and 
Lehn offer only a monistic economic perspective concentrating on a single industry: 
the airline industry, which undoubtedly is potent in character but certainly not 
representative of an entire economy. This produces a somewhat in-depth - yet 
compartmental and thus incomplete perspective. Therefore our empirical evidence 
based on longitudinal analysis intends to fill this gap by offering a multidimensional 
approach to UK corporate governance evolution in the context of the OECD regulatory 
principles. 
 
A more analytical robust and historically detailed analysis is offered by Coffee (1999)15 
and later by Cheffins (2001)16. Despite ŽĨĨĞĞ ?Ɛresearch being largely US centred, he 
frequently references and historically contextualises developments in UK corporate 
governance, which produces insightful comparative perspectives. Significantly, in 
consideration of the scope and extent of this research paper, Coffee addresses highly 
relevant normative questions pertaining to corporate governance evolution in his 
work, such as divergence and convergence trends. These trends must be considered 
as important present and future characteristics of UK corporate governance evolution. 
Interestingly Coffee concludes that the law only plays a minor 17  ƌŽůĞ P  ‘ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌƐ
depend on relationships, not law ?18  which notably our research supports with 
empirical evidence. Moreover both, Coffee (1999) and Cheffins (2001), highlight the 
h< ?Ɛ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ19  corporate governance position in western financial markets by 
reference to the design and evolution of its regulatory framework. Pioneering efforts 
by both authors, offer a more substantial comparative finance-historical context to 
corporate governance evolution and fill some important gaps in the literature by 
setting their research findings into a useful, larger multidisciplinary framework. 
However both authors contribute largely descriptive pieces of work that not only lack 
empirical evidence but more significantly fail to thematise and subsequently scrutinise 
                                                        
12 Stacey ǡǡǮDeregulation, the Evolution of Corporate Governance Structure, 
and Survivalǯ [1997] The American Economic Review 421 
13 J Gordon and M Roe, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Jeffrey N. Gordon 
and Mark J. Roe eds, CUP 2010) 
14 Marianna Belloc and Ugo ǡǯ-evolution of poliǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ
International Review of Law and Economics 106 
15 John C. Jr. ǡǮǣor Global Convergence in Corporate 
ǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ? ? 
16 Brian R. ǡǮ

ǣǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ? 
17 John C. Jr. ǡǮǣor Global Convergence in Corporate 
ǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ? ? 
18 Ibid 
19 Brian R. ǡǮ

ǣǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ? 
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the most important period of UK corporate governance evolution: the last two 
decades, which define significant corporate governance reforms. Given the 
exponential rise in corporate governance regulatory frameworks during these two 
decades both research approaches are insightful but remain incomplete and therefore 
unsatisfactory.  
 
Keasey, Thompson and Wright (2005) delivered one of the first comprehensive, 
descriptive monologues on the development of UK corporate governance. In that 
sense this paper presents a methodological as well as an interpretative advancement 
of their theories in aspects. Amongst other things the authors introduce and discuss 
relevant significant corporate governance parameters, such as the role of financial 
market structures, the role of the normative  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĨŽƌŵ ?20 and the 
influence of regulatory institutional frameworks. In this respect the work by Keasey, 
Thompson and Wright has laid the groundwork for corporate governance 
development analysis. Certainly its greatest strength is illustrated in their continuous, 
critical approach, which pertains to elaborate on challenges, and particular 
problematic issues surrounding this research area. This means that the authors 
address, critically contextualise, and juxtapose several aspects of proponent and 
opponent viewpoints relating to corporate governance systems and structures. 
However the work of Keasey, Thompson and Wright does appear incomplete. It falls 
short in presenting at least one detailed, longitudinal empirical analysis of the relevant 
corporate governance parameters mentioned above. Our research paper intends to 
fill this gap by providing the first longitudinal, empirical analysis that covers the most 
significant, recent corporate governance development period from 1995-2014, 
critically analysing and contrasting individual UK norms against the respective 
regulatory OECD principles to provide empirical evidence relating to the role, 
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨ h< ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ governance 
performance.  
 
De Nicolo, Laeven and Ueda (2007) published an interesting empirical, longitudinal 
(1994-2003) study that analyses cross-country quality of corporate governance, 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐ  ‘ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ? ŶĞǁ ůĂǁƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ Ă
ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?dŚĞŝƌƐƚƵĚǇŚĞĂǀŝůǇƐĐƌƵƚŝŶŝƐĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝƐĞƐ
empirical data constructing a corporate governance quality (CGQ) index. The evolution 
of this quality index is observed between the years 1995-2014 and ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŽŶŽƵƚƉƵƚŐƌŽǁƚŚ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŐƌŽǁƚŚ ?ĂŶĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚŽŶ
country level and on industry growth is assessed.  Controversially their analysis on 
corporate governance quality evolution suffers from three substantial deficits, which 
our research attempts to rectify ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇƚŚĞŝƌƐĞƚƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐŽŶĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ‘ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ
                                                        
20 Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson and Mark Wright (eds), Corporate Governance Ȃ Accountability, 
Enterprise and International Comparisons (John Wiley & Sons 2005) 
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governance quality  W ŝŶƚƌĞŶĚƐĂŶĚƌĞĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?ĂƌĞŚŝŐŚůǇƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?dŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌs did 
not define nor explain their definition and/or categorisation parameters in the context 
of  ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ?'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƋƵĂůŝƚǇĐĂŶŝƚƐĞůĨ be viewed as highly subjective, the 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇŝŵƉůŝĞƐĂŐƌĞĂƚ ?Ğƌ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶd can therefore 
not be viewed as suitable for drawing more generalised conclusions. This undermines 
ƚŚĞ ƉĂƉĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞand consequently lessens its analytical effectiveness. 
Secondly De Nicolo, Laeven and Ueda explain that they are using  ‘ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ďĂƐĞĚ
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ ‘de jure ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ? ?21 Despite the 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƐĞǀĞƌĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽƵƐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞďĂƐĞĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?
approach, it nonetheless appears to be deficient. That means the authors argue that 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐ  ‘de jure ? ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ŝƐ  ‘ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ? ? tŚŝůĞ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶ
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ŝƐ ƚƌƵĞ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ  ‘de jure ?ƐƵďĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ
ƚŚĞǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨůĞŐĂůĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƌĞŐŝŵĞƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵƚĐŽŵe 
ďĂƐĞĚ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐŝŶŐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ůĞŐĂů ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? /Ŷ ŽƚŚĞƌ
words, their contribution would have been enhanced by a combination of the two.  
Additionally De Nicolo, Laeven and Ueda offered a relatively short time frame analysis 
of only nine years, more significantly excluding the years centring on the financial 
crisis. It is this particular gap that our research fills, by offering a crucially longer 
empirical analysis including not only the important 2007-2009 time period but also 
offering a combined analysis of economic and legal factors pertaining to UK corporate 
governance evolution. 
 
In 2009 Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud presented an empirical micro-regulatory 
analysis22 that focuses on the role of the law pertaining to the functionality of the 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉůǇŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĞŶƐŚƌŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘h<ŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĚĞ ? ?dŚĞŝƌ
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ĨŝƌƐƚůǇ ĚŝƐƐĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŽĚĞ ? ďǇ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐ ŝƚƐ
regulatory flexibility with more mandatory, statutory corporate governance regimes 
and secondly contextualises and discusses these finding in terms of whether this 
ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉůǇŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?ŝƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌeffectiveness 
in terms of monitoring and enforcement. While the authors discuss fundamental 
aspects of UK corporate governance in relation to soft law versus hard law 
approaches, their work appears somewhat simplistic and overly generalising. 
Consequently their line of argumentation suffers from a mono-perspectival analysis. 
Given that corporate governance analysis in any context is a highly complex process, 
ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ƵŶƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞ ? ^ǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ĂƐƐĞƌƚ
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂŵŽƌĞƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƚŽĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽĂ “ďŽǆ-ticking ?
                                                        
21 Gianni De Nicolo, Luc Laeven, Kenichi ǡǮ quality: Trends and real ǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ	 ? ? ? 
22 Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno, Antoine Faure-
ǡǯCorporate Governance in the UK: Is ǫǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑconomics 
193 
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ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ?23 This statement fails to recognise the objective, almost technical precision 
of more statutory legal regimes, which by no means must result in a mere box-ticking 
approach. Therefore the authors clearly refer to characteristics of the implementation 
of this approach and not to its inherent, underlying (useful) structural elements. That 
means not only do the authors fail to present quantifiable data and/or hermeneutical 
evidence to support their assertion, conversely they also generalise specific 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨ ‘ŵŽƌĞƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĂĐƚƵĂůĨĂĐƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ
of global legal systems, in order to support their theory. Thus their analysis, despite 
offering some useful insight remains undifferentiated, limited to largely broad-brush 
comparisons.  
 
Several years later Matos and Faustino (2012) 24  introduced an insightful 
complementary piece of empirical research that applies econometric estimation 
techniques to the analysis of European corporate governance evolution, specifically in 
the context of convergence.25 Although the analysis is very short it poses a number of 
interesting and important questions, such as does the level of corporate governance 
convergence across European countries correlate to a specific legal/institutional 
framework? Thereby the authors significantly link and explore empirical corporate 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ƚŽ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ  “ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĨĂĐĞƚƐ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐ ƚŚĞ
academic discussion in this field substantially, as the authors demonstrate that the 
convergence process differs between the Anglo-American and Continental models of 
corporate governance. Significantly this means that authors produce evidence that 
the regulatory framework, and more specifically the law, matter. Our paper goes 
further by exploring exactly how we think it matters. However the authors themselves 
identify a number of shortcomings in their work, namely the lack of additional control 
variables allowing for a more dynamic analysis. This gap is filled by our empirical 
analysis. 
 
Finally Zalewska (2014)26  presents a qualitative post Cadbury and Sarbanes-Oxley 
corporate governance analysis27 pertaining to specific challeng s in the context of 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ
shareholders have, since the 1990s, transformed the natural evolution of corporate 
                                                        
23 Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno, Antoine Faure-
ǡǯCorporate Governance in the UK: Is ǫǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ
193 
24 ǡ	ǡǮ-convergence and sigma convergence in 
ǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ ? ? ? ?
25 Anna ǡǮǣǡ
after Sarbanes-ǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ	 ? 
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid 
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governance into a revolution ? ?28 The author discusses the question as to what caused 
the dramatic regulatory changes in that period highlighting the individual regulatory 
steps taken by the different legislators (UK and US). Despite offering an interesting 
comparative legal analysis between UK and US corporate governance regulatory 
reforms, the contribution lacks greater in-depth critical analysis that explores the 
correlation between financial markets and the law; it also fails to empirically link and 
contextualise these finding. Therefore Zaleweska ?Ɛwork appears incomplete and 
remains somewhat superficial in its research approach.  
 
To conclude, previously produced literature and research findings on empirical UK 
corporate governance evolution, considering longitudinal data sets that cover a 
sufficiently long and crucial time period (e.g. the financial crisis) appear insufficient 
and significantly under researched. As demonstrated above current literature lacks in-
depth critical analysis that contextualises the role of the law in conjunction to a 
coŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞh<ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?/ƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ůĂǁ
ĐůĞĂƌůǇŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ?29 ďƵƚĂƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ “ũƵƐƚŚŽǁŝƐůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶĐůĞĂƌ ? ?30 We present evidence 
to demonstrate that law does in fact play a role, but that role is a different, more 
differentiated one.  
 
Methodology 
 
The 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance constituted the major piece of 
international regulation, which gained widespread attention in the early part of this 
century. Most developing countries fashioned their corporate governance regulations 
based on these principles. Thus from a comparative law perspective the OECD 
principles provide a touchstone to measure to what extent a country has adopted the 
generally recognised uniform corporate governance principles. Another dimension 
worthy of exploration is the tilt towards shareholder primacy corporate governance, 
although a lip service is paid to stakeholderism as OECD principles mostly tend to lean 
towards shareholder primacy corporate governance. Thus an empirical analysis which 
studies the evolution of UK corporate governance pegged to the 2004 OECD standard 
would also reveal the increased or decreased tilt to shareholder primacy corporate 
governance.  
 
We analyse fifty-two variables each of which is capable of three basic answers: absent, 
optional or not widely enforced, and compulsory or widely enforced. Thus the study 
tries to bridge the gap between law in books and law in action. We also move beyond 
                                                        
28 Anna ǡǮǣǡ
after Sarbanes-ǯȏ ? ? ? ?Ȑ	 ? 
29 R Morck and L Steier, The global history of Corporate Governance: an Introduction (Randall K. 
Morck ed, University of Chicago Press 2005) 
30 Ibid 
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the binomial paradigm of presence or absence of law in books, which still finds favour 
in much empirical work. A brief variable description is given in Appendix A, it is 
thematically divided into four subcategories Anti-Stakeholder rights index, Minority 
shareholders rights index, Anti-Managerial rights index and Shareholder rights index. 
The completed questionnaire for the UK for 1995-2014 is available in Appendix B. The 
coded table is available in Appendix C. 
 
An item response model with Kalman filter is used to compress the data into an index. 
Computer codes for the same are available in Appendix D. For a quasi-experimental 
analysis of the impact we also look at five financial market variables namely - S&P 
global equity index, traded volume of stocks traded, Number of listed domestic 
companies, Market capitalisation of listed companies, and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). An explanation of the variables is available in Appendix E. These five variables 
are melded into a financial market development index by executing a Bayesian factor 
analysis. The computer code is available in Appendix D.  
 
In undertaking the quasi-experimental analysis exploratory techniques like change 
point analysis are first used. This will show the time period when change(s) has/have 
occurred in the overall normative corporate governance evolution in addition to 
financial development. This will help to pinpoint whether corporate governance 
 ‘ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĨŽůůŽǁĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůďŽŽŵŽƌ ŝĨ ŝƚ ŝƐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇƌŽƵŶĚ ?tĞƵƐĞƚŚĞZ
package bcp to implement the change point solutions.31   
 
Historical Context  
 
It is notable that the UK is predominantly a Common Law jurisdiction (although it 
should be recognised that Scottish Law is a hybrid Civil/Common Law system rooted 
in Roman law). Principally the impact of the common law is felt in two effects, firstly, 
legislation may anticipate, and give authority to further detail, provided as secondary 
legislation, or regulation, and that the courts have an interpretative role where 
legislation is brought before them; and secondly, that law  W the Common Law - is 
developed through the courts quite separately to the provisions of Parliament. 
Legislation is by its nature less detailed and all encompassing than might be the case 
in Civil law jurisdictions, allowing Parliament to revisit as necessary, without disruption 
of any wider design. The English courts interpret and apply legislation, but also 
adjudicate on issues outside of statute in common law developing law through binding 
precedent or Stare Decisis. This background is useful in providing the context of the 
development of corporate governance in the UK. 
 
                                                        
31 bcp: Bayesian Analysis of Change Point Problems <https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/bcp/index.html> 
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The core of the 20th century approach to the establishment and governance of 
companies is founded in the legislative provision of the first half of the 19th century. 
The legislation from 1844 onwards established the pattern for the incorporation of 
companies in the UK, and thereby the theoretical presumptions, which have formed 
the basis of the UK approach to corporate governance throughout the major part of 
the 20th century. Until the period of legislation beginning with the Joint Stock 
ŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĐƚ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚũŽŝŶƚƐƚŽĐŬĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?were 
those relatively limited examples of companies created by Royal Charter or Private Act 
of Parliament. The former not insignificant in giving rise to esteemed organisations 
and pillars of society, and the latter facilitating significant sectoral industrial progress, 
e.g. through the railways. 
 
WŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŽƌ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵŶŝŶĐŽƌporated joint stock 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? however became, limited and failing to meet the appetite for economic 
growth. Moreover, the demands of industry and commerce were two-fold: 
incorporation and limited liability. Whilst the former was provided by the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844 (the Gladstone Act) the latter was rather more controversial. The 
call for limited liability to be enshrined in statute rested upon a number of differing 
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? WƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ǁĂƐ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ
security for small investors who would otherwise remain outside of industrial 
development, and thereby restrict the potential pool of investors essential for 
continued economic growth. At this time a distinction was also drawn between those 
investors who had been able, by the terms of their contractual relationship with the 
subject company, to exclude potential liability, and those who had not been able to 
secure such an advantageous position. As a contract is an obligation created and 
policed by the parties themselves, it would be beyond the control of Parliament, and 
the differential position of those with contractual protection and those without could 
therefore only be addressed by legislation imposing a broader limitation of liability as 
represented by the Limited Liability Act 1855; the combined position better facilitating 
the corporate economy (Hannah, 1983)32. Although the legislative framework has 
been added to from time to time, the shape of company formation and governance 
was largely established until the late 20th century with the emergence of the current 
focus on corporate governance. 
 
The laissez-faire principles dominant in the 19th century remained influential in the 
20th century, not least in relation to the general hands-off, non-interference stance 
directed towards the growing corporate economy (Hunt, 1936) 33 . The immanent 
principles relating to property rights became extended to corporate property, 
                                                        
32 Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (2nd edn, Methuen 1983) 
33 Bishop C. Hunt, The Development of the Business Corporation in England 1800 Ȃ 1867 (Harvard 
University Press 1936) 
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notwithstanding their incorporation, influencing the emergence of the doctrine of 
shareholder value. However, beyond this there is little evidence of further overt 
development in terms of corporate governance during this period, suggestive not least 
of a lack of interest on the part of successive governments. The reasons are no doubt 
complex, but may be summarised on the part of Conservative governments on the 
basis that the status quo presented no real issues at the time. In contrast, it might 
seem surprising that the post-war Labour governments were similarly silent, the 
answer here may simply be that their interests lay elsewhere, principally in relation to 
the focus on public ownership and the development of the Welfare State. During the 
period of the Blair/New Labour government starting in 1997, the outlook of the Labour 
party had changed, and domestic and global corporate events meant that the subject 
of corporate governance could no longer be ignored. However, that is not to say that 
the Labour governance had shown no interest, as indicated by the report of the 
Committee of Enquiry into Industrial Democracy (1977), otherwise known as the 
ƵůůŽĐŬZĞƉŽƌƚ ?dŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĚƌĂĨƚ
5th Company Law Directive sought to harmonise worker participation in management 
proposing a form of worker involvement within company governance. Whilst this 
might have been viewed as representative of a move towards a broader stakeholder 
perspective, we should not overlook the fact that the recommendation also presented 
a potential means of addressing the inherent problems of a period of enduring 
industrial dispute. 
 
 
Empirical analysis of corporate governance evolution in UK 
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The change in corporate governance in the UK in the last twenty years is minimal, but 
the probability of any change point in the last twenty years is highest in year 12 
(probability: 1) with minor changes in year 7 (probability: 0.62), year 11 (probability: 
0.72) and year 13 (probability: 0.72). The major shift corresponds to the year 2006 
with minor shifts in 2001, 2005 and 2007. These shifts can be attributed to the 
publication of several non-binding codes such as good practice suggestions from the 
Higgs Report34 and the publication of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in 2006; the Myners Report35 and the Code 
of Good Practice36 by Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds in 2001; and on 
Internal Control: the Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code published 
by FRC in 2005 etc. The above highpoints will now be discussed in greater qualitative 
detail. 
 
The Combined Code 1998 
 
The Combined Code 1998, prompted by the collapse of Barings Bank etc, incorporated 
the key elements of the Cadbury37, Greenbury38, and Hampel39 reports, disseminating 
ǁŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?WĂƌŬŝŶƐŽŶĂŶĚ<ĞůůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?40. 
The compliance strategy adopted relied on voluntary disclosure, through the 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ŽĨ  ‘ĐŽŵƉůǇ Žƌ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ? ? dŚĞ ƐĞůĨ-regulatory approach might be viewed 
ƋƵŝǌǌŝĐĂůůǇ ďǇ ƐŽŵĞ ? ďƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ  ‘ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ ? ĂŶĚ
presented something of a challenge to companies with effective self-regulation 
reducing the need for future statutory control (Gamble and Kelly, 2001)41. 
 
The Combined Code represents a reactive stance. The influential Cadbury Report itself 
was a private initiative established by the Financial Reporting Council, the London 
Stock Exchange and the accountancy professions, in response to a series of high profile 
corporate events. Indeed, the nature of the initiative allowed the enquiry to broaden 
its remit in the light of further incidents (particularly BCCI and Maxwell). The broad 
aim of the Committee was to raise standards of financial reporting and accountability 
in UK listed companies, although its impact was in fact more widespread, influencing 
the development of corporate governance codes more widely.  
Whilst primarily focused on the need to enhance standards of financial reporting and 
accountability, the approach taken by Cadbury envisaged that the board would 
                                                        
34 	ȋ	ȌǡǮ
ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ 
35  HM Treasury (2001) Ǯǣǯ Paul Myners 
36 Association of Unit 	ǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/autif.pdf> 
37 Sir Adrian Cadbury, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspect of Corporate Governance 
(Gee & Co. Ltd. 1992) 
38 Sir Richard Greenbury, Directors Remuneration (Gee & Co. Ltd. 1995) 
39 Sir Ronnie Hampel, Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report (Gee & Co. Ltd. 1998) 
40 John Parkinson, Gavin Kelly, ǮThe Combined Code on Corporate Governanceǯ [1999] Political 
Quarterly 101 
41 Andrew Gamble, Gavin Kelly, (2001) ǮShareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UKǯ 
[2001] Corporate Governance 110 
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nonetheless be enabled to push the company on to take advantage of a competitive 
environment, albeit with the expectation of accountability, even though of a voluntary 
nature. It was not intended to lead to corporate sterility, but rather ensure a higher 
level of Best Practice highlighting transparency within a voluntary regulatory 
framework, where compliance may not always be demanded, but must always be 
explained. 
 
Recommendations of the Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(Cadbury), focused on the reporting function, and relationship between board, audit, 
and shareholders. The Code of Best Practice being based upon the key precepts of 
openness, accountability, and integrity. The comprehensive framework represented 
in Cadbury sought, inter alia, to define a template for clear and transparent 
governance, from the need for regular board meetings retaining effective control and 
oversight of the executive management, to recognition of the value of nonexecutive 
directors both in bringing an independent perspective in relation to strategy and 
performance, and providing a measure of independence on questions of 
remuneration, to attention to the relationship with auditors with reference to both 
audit and non-audit services etc. 
 
The later Greenbury Committee, an initiative of the CBI, reporting in 1995 in response 
to public and shareholder concern over director remuneration, followed Cadbury 
quite swiftly.  Whilst the focus of Greenbury was much narrower than Cadbury, they 
shared a commonality of theme, particularly in relation to accountability, 
responsibility, transparency and full disclosure, the alignment of director and 
shareholder interests, and improved company performance, in addition to the 
ŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƌĞŵƵŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
The final limb of the triumvirate leading to the Combined Code is represented by the 
Hampel Report. The Hampel Report on Corporate Governance (1998) came from an 
initiative of the Financial Reporting Council. Its remit whilst broader than Cadbury and 
Greenbury, built upon the earlier reports, generally endorsing the findings of each of 
them.  Hampel, however, does go further than its predecessors in emphasising the 
significance of the institutional investors themselves, in relation to the governance of 
the investee companies. The overall theme of transparency communicated by the 
earlier reports, however, remains evident.    
 
Drawing from the 3 reports the Combined Code 1998 addresses two broad themes: 
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĨĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ĐĂůůŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚƚŽ ‘ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂ
sound system of internal control to safeguard share-ŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ
focusing on the institutional investor. Relying upon the detailed considerations of 
Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel, the Combined Code represents a timely and 
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effective response to the emerging millennial corporate landscape. The compliance 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ ‘ĐŽŵƉůǇŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨƚŚĞh<ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? 
 
The Revised Combined Codes 
 
The basic template for corporate governance in the UK provided by the original 
Combined Code has been revisited on several occasions (2003, 2005 and 2006). The 
first in 2003 responding to, and incorporating the key recommendations of both the 
Higgs, and the Smith reports, with later updating taking place in 2005 and 2006 before 
the major revision in 2010 (see below). 
 
Higgs42, reporting in 2003, was tasked with a review of the effectiveness of the existing 
provision in relation to non-executive directors, and the audit committee. As had been 
the case on previous occasions, the review of the provision in UK law was timely in the 
light of the reverberations of yet another corporate scandal, in this instance Enron. 
The failings of Enron related not only to their own activities, but extended to their 
auditors who had failed to press directors hard enough in relation to concealed losses. 
The comparison with the UK response in the Higgs review, and that of the USA is 
striking. Whereas the former continued in supporting the existing UK non-
ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ?  ‘ĐŽŵƉůǇ Žƌ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ŝŶƚ ŽĚƵĐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ 
Industry Reform Act 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act), protecting investors from fraudulent 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐďǇĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐďǇŝŵƉŽƐŝŶŐŵĂŶĚĂƚŽƌǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐŽŶK ?ƐĂŶĚ&K ?Ɛ
supported by serious criminal sanctions. Higgs did recommend more stringent 
requirements in relation to both the membership of boards and the appraisement of 
independent directors, but nonetheless remains loyal to the non-prescriptive 
approach. The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can ot, however, be ignored as the 
sphere of application is not strictly limited to US companies, but extends to both US 
and non-US companies, even where the Act may be in direct conflict with the home 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ŽĨ ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? dŚĞ ĨĨĞĐƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĨŽƌ ƐŽŵĞ
companies to choose to become delisted from the NYSE, and for others to be 
dissuaded from applying. 
 
The Smith Review (2003) also reflected the significance of the company audit 
committee, and the necessary independence of auditors. In relation to the former, 
Smith impressing the significance oĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ƚŽ  ‘ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and internal 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?  ?ƉĂƌĂ  ? ? ? ? ? ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ǀĂůƵĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝŶ h<
corporate governance. 
The UK Corporate Governance Code  
 
                                                        
42 Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors (DTI 2003) 
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In 2010 the Combined Code was revised, in the light of the Davies and Sharman 
Reports, and re-designated as the UK Corporate Governance Code (with further 
updates following in 2012 and 2014). The updated code does not represent any 
distinct chĂŶŐĞŽĨĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚĚŽĞƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĂŶĞǁĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ ‘ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞ ?ŝŶ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŵŝǆ ?ĂŶĚƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƐĞƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚ  ‘ƚŽŶĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƚŽƉ ? ?
Beyond this development, the significance of the revisions relate largely to the 
continuing themes of: risk management and internal control; remuneration (stressing 
the need to link to delivery of long-term benefits to the business); and shareholder 
engagement.  
 
Whilst the 2010 code, as updated, does not present any radical change of direction, 
the significance of a regularly updated and informed code is representative of a 
mature controlled approach to corporate governance, albeit one that remains largely 
reactive in nature.    
 
The Companies Act 2006 
 
Since its emergence in the Cadbury Report, corporate governance in the UK has largely 
relied upon a narrow outlook, focusing on profit maximisation through the 
prioritisation of the shareholder. We have, however, already noted that this is not the 
only approach that might be adopted, nonetheless although Hampel (para 1.3) 
suggests that good governance will ensure that stakeholders with an interest in the 
company will be taken into account, it is difficult to see this as reliable in such a 
shareholder centric framework. Broader definitions have been mooted (Sheridan and 
Kendall, 1992) 43 , and are more characteristic of some other jurisdictions, and 
particularly relevant to some other EU jurisdictions, and the process of EU 
harmonisation. The 1999 Consultation Document (Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework), reflected upon broader interests 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ŵĂǇďĞ ƐĞƌǀĞĚ ? ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ Ă ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ‘ĞŶůŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ
ǀĂůƵĞ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĐŽƵůĚďĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶ
the present framework, ĂŶĚĂ  ‘ƉůƵƌĂůŝƐƚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞ ƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌ
stakeholder interest, but would demand significant changes to company law with, 
particular impact on directors.   
 
Much of the development of corporate governance in the UK to this point has rested 
upon the notion that the governance of the company is presumed to be solely in the 
interest of the shareholder. We may note the terms of s 309 of Companies Act 1985, 
ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ
empůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ? ďƵƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ŵĂŬĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŝŶƌŽĂĚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
shareholder/stakeholder debate, not least for the reasons identified below. 
 
The Companies Act 2006 represented a timely and necessary review of the law, taking 
the opportunity to reflect upon the pre-existing position focusing on the shareholder, 
ďƵƚ ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŽŵƉĂŶǇ >Ăǁ ZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ƚŽ ĂĚŽƉƚ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ‘ĞŶůŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚ
ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌ ? Ăpproach. This is particularly reflected in s 172 which establishes a 
                                                        
43 T Sheridan and N Kendall, Corporate Governance, An Action Plan for Profitability and Business 
Success, (Financial Ties/Pitman Publishing 1992) 
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ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ĚƵƚǇ ŽŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ŐŽŽĚ ĨĂŝƚŚ ? ƚŽ  ‘ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ĂƐ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ? ? ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŽ Ă  ?ŶŽŶ-
exhaustive list) of considerations including: reference to the long-term consequence 
of their decisions; the interests of employees; relationships with other stakeholders 
(suppliers, customers etc.); the wider community and environment; maintaining the 
reputation and standards of the coŵƉĂŶǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ ‘ĂĐƚĨĂŝƌůǇĂƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ? 
 
Taken at face value, s 172 would seem to support a change of direction in corporate 
governance in the UK, broadening corporate responsibility from a narrow shareholder 
perspective, to a wider community of stakeholders. However, it continues to be the 
case that shareholders remain the principal focus, with the secondary stakeholder 
interests only being relevant to the extent that the directors, acting in good faith, 
consider it necĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŽŚĂǀĞƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?ǁŚĞŶĂĐƚŝŶŐ ‘ĨŽƌƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚ
ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ĂƐ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ? ?  &ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ŝƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŶŽƚĞĚ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶǇ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŽ
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌƐ ? ? ?ŝƐ ?ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇ ?ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽ
the point of sterility. The decision to litigate lies with the directors, meaning that those 
allegedly acting contrary to the Act may themselves have sufficient weight to block an 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĞǀĞŶǁŚĞƌĞĂĨƵůůǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚďŽĂƌĚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐŝƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽ ‘ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞ
succesƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ?tŚŝĐŚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
s172 represents any real change in the shareholder value perspective. This is not a 
new problem, but one, which also restricted the practical significance of s 309 of the 
1985 Act (Keay, 2007)44.  
 
The Stewardship Code 2010 
 
Emanating from the Financial Reporting Council, the Stewardship Code attends to the 
position of institutional investors with voting rights, extending expectations in relation 
to transparency to their voting, and voting policy. The practical effect of the code is to 
enhance the engagement of institutional investors, which in turn will pay dividends in 
relation to the corporate governance of the investee company, and encourage 
openness and transparency in relation to their own compliance in the ŝŶǀĞƐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ home 
company. The approach encourages transparency in relation to the stewardship 
function, giving a two-ǁĂǇďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ?ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŵƉůǇŽƌ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?
model. 
 
Development in Financial Market Growth 
 
                                                        
44 Andrew Keay, Ǯǣǯ
Enlightened Shareholder Value Approachǯ [2007] Sydney Law Review 577 
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The probability of change points in UK financial market development is highest for 
year 9 (probability: 0.88) and year 13 (probability: 0.91), corresponding to the years 
2004 and 2008 respectively. There was a sustained upswing in the financial market in 
the UK from 2003 to 2007, which ĞŶ ĞƌŶĂŶŬĞ  ‘ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ? ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ƚŚĂŶŬƐ ƚŽ
ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ŚĂĚ ĞŶƚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĞƌĂ ŽĨ  “ŐƌĞĂƚ
ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨƉƌŝĐĞƐĂŶĚŽƵƚƉƵƚƐ ŝƐŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĞĚ ? ?45 The FTSE 
regained the height of the late 1990s dotcom boom. 46  Mervyn King, the then 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŽƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŶŬ ŽĨ ŶŐůĂŶĚ ƚĞƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŝĐĞ ?  ?ŶŽŶ-inflationary 
consistently expansionary) decade,47 which Gordon Brown, the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, claimed helped ƐŽůǀĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďŽŽŵ ĂŶĚ ďƵƐƚ ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĞǀĞƌ
greater economic growth.48 It is postulated here ƚŚĂƚĚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞŶŝŐŶ
macro-economic situation encouraged investment in both capital and financial 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?  ? ? ? &ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ďĞĐĂme willing to take on more risky 
investments because they were more confident that there would not be any major 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĚŽǁŶƚƵƌŶ ? ?49 This nonetheless led to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and 
                                                        
45 Ha-ǡǮǡ a bubble Ȃ ǯThe Guardianǯ (London, 
24 February 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/24/recovery-
bubble-crash-uk-us-investors> 
46 ǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȍ
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3359241.stm> 
47 Speech given by Mervyn King, Leicester 14 October 2003 as cited in Treasury Committee, 
House of Commons, Banking Crisis: Dealing with the Failure of the UK Banks : Report, Together 
with Formal Minutes (Seventh report of session 2008-09) 12 
48 ǡǮǣǯ
(The Guardian, 11 September 2008) < 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/sep/11/gordonbrown.economy > accessed 15 May 
2015 
49 Tejvan PetǡǮ
ǯȋEconomics Help, 21 February 2013) 
<http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/6901/economics/the-great-moderation/> accessed 15 
May 2015  
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the London Stock Exchange suffered the worst fall in its history.50 As shown in the 
graph above, the post-2008 the financial market fell back to its pre-2004 level. 
Therefore we find little correlation between the changes in corporate governance and 
the financial market. In our analysis we find that financial market growth in the UK is 
governed to a greater extent by the macro-economic climate rather than changes in 
(Common) law. There might be two main reasons for this. Firstly the  ‘comply or 
explain ? regime in UK along with an impactful rule of law makes corporate governance 
easy to implement - but makes it more difficult to facilitate for any perceptible change 
ŝŶƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇǁĞĂƌŐƵĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ ‘ůĂǁŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ?
hypothesis. Secondly, the UK being a global hub of financial market reacts more to 
vagaries of global financial movements rather than changes or reforms in the light 
touch of respective domestic regulations.  
 
Corporate Governance Reform 
 
/Ŷ  ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞKŝƐƐƵĞĚƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘WƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?  ?ƌĞǀŝsed 2004), 
after wide consultation with national governments, the private sector, International 
Banks etc. The OECD Principles represent common characteristics recognised as 
necessary for good corporate governance and share commonality with our own 
internal framework over a range of areas. However, the key point of divergence 
relates to Principle IV, which focuses specifically on the role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance. The OECD highlight their preference for corporate governance 
ŵŽĚĞůƐƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĂĐƚŝǀĞĐŽ-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability 
ŽĨĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůůǇƐŽƵŶĚĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ? ?dŽĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞǆƚĞŶƚŝƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƐ ? ? ?
Companies Act 1985, and s172 Companies Act 2006 represent significant movement 
in the direction of stakeholder values, however, as indicated above, the categories of 
stakeholder indicated in both Acts of Parliament remain secondary considerations for 
ƚŚĞďŽĂƌĚ ?ǁŚŽĂƌĞŽŶůǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŵƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ?
ŝŶŐŽŽĚĨĂŝƚŚ ?ŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚe success of the company for the benefit of 
ŝƚƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ? ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƉƉ ƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ
in relation to s309 (1985) and s172 (2006), may lead us to consider that although 
stakeholder interests may be advertised in tŚĞĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ‘ǁŝŶĚŽǁ ? ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚĨŽƌ
ƐĂůĞŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ‘ƐŚŽƉ ? ?
 
It follows that the current position would therefore suggest that any move towards 
convergence with the OECD principles, or harmonisation in EU terms has, until now 
been limited. Interestingly, however, in the aftermath of the Brexit vote on 23rd June 
                                                        
50 ǡǮ	ǣǯThe 
Telegraph (London, 6 October 2008) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/3147764/Financial-crisis-London-stock-
exchange-suffers-worst-fall-in-history.html> 
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2016, we have seen a greater interest in the incorporation of stakeholder values into 
the UK corporate governance framework. In particular, the Green Paper on Corporate 
Governance Reform, published in November 2016 states the purpose of corporate 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞďĞŝŶŐƚŽ  ‘ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůĂŶĚƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ
that can deliver the long-ƚĞƌŵƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ĂĚĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŬĞǇĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ
protecting the interests of shareholders where they are distant from the directors 
running a company. It also involves having regard to the interests of employees, 
customers, suppliers and others with direct interest in the performance of a 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ? 
  
Contextualising Corporate Governance and Financial Market Development Change 
Points  
 
In order to visualise the evolution of normative corporate governance change points 
against the time specific financial market development change points based on our 
empirical data the two graphs have been merged as illustrated in the following 
diagram.  
 
 
 
The diagram illustrates the combined previously discussed change points. 
Significantly, it highlights that based on our empirical data we find that financial 
market development and financial market growth appear to bear little correlation to 
significant change points in normative corporate governance development. This 
provides empirical evidence for our argument againƐƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĂǁŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ?ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ
and further distinguishes this view, supporting our hypothesis and positing that 
several historical and economic reasons in conjunction with a robust rule of law in the 
UK contributed to the development of a strong financial UK market, and the law 
especially the type or tilt is less relevant. 
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Conclusion 
In mapping the normative development of UK corporate governance between the 
years 1995 and 2014, we have undertaken the first longitudinal empirical study of its 
kind advancing and refining the conception of UK corporate governance evolution. 
The specific change points used for this analysis have been contextualised against the 
background of UK financial market development and financial market growth. 
However, we found no statistically relevant empirical evidence pertaining to changes 
in corporate governance and the financial market, and therefore conclude that there 
is little correlation between the two. Instead, we argue that changes in UK financial 
market development and financial market growth up until this point can be explained 
rather by a combination of other factors. However, notable changes, such as reforms 
in the UK corporate governance framework, relating to a greater interest in the 
incorporation of stakeholder values might paint a different picture. Thus, 
interestingly, in 2017, in terms of its corporate governance legal framework, the UK 
finds itself in a somewhat paradoxical situation. Whilst it is on the cusp of political 
divergence from its closest trading neighbours (the EU), at the same time it may be 
closer to the concept of convergence of corporate governance ideas now than it has 
been at any point in the past. 
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